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Abstract
Africa is one of the world regions whose development potentials are particularly
important. But despite this situation, Africa is one of the continents where poverty
exists on a large scale. More than 44 % of the African population lives below the
poverty line. Yet, various forms of development strategies have been designed and
implemented in the African countries. In 1992, in its publication Governance and
Development, the World Bank refers to the quality of government as the cause of the
failure of several of these strategies. Attention is henceforth focused on how
governments organize the management of state and govern economic activities. The
place and the role of institutions in development have been widely discussed in
economic literature. It is commonly accepted that the existence of strong and clear
rules is a fundamental basis for economic activity. In particular, there is an
increasingly agreement on the idea that, in order to stimulate private investment, it is
necessary to stabilize the business environment. This study uses the World Bank
Doing Business indicators to evaluate the influence of business environment in
explaining private investment from a panel of thirty-eight African Sub-Saharan
countries over the period 2006-2011. We performed a dynamic panel model using the
Generalized Method of Moments estimation. The following evidence globally
emerges: burdensome regulations affect private investment while business
environment improvement makes investment grow.
Keywords: Governance, business environment, investment.

Introduction
It is widely accepted that investment is one of the most important determinants of growth.
From the point of view of economic analysis it is stated that productive investment impacts both
the supply and the demand and contributes to growth and job creation. From the supply side,
investment improves the productive capacity through the acquisition of new equipment that
incorporates technical progress and consequently contributes to the increase in labor productivity.
These productivity gains could then spread to other economic sectors. From the demand side,
investment helps to increase demand for goods and services due to the fact that the observed
productivity gains may lead to prices reduction and wages increase. These two phenomena lead to
an increase of households’ purchasing power and then an increase of demand. This was the case
in Africa in the few past years where growth was mainly driven by domestic demand (AfDB,
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OECD, & UNDP, 2014)1. Indeed, Africa experienced in recent years, at the same time an increase
in domestic consumption due to high levels of wages and remittances and high levels of private
investment and infrastructure investment. These factors led to an increase in domestic demand.
Basically investment, that is to say the change in the capital stock between two periods,
depends on two factors: the cost of capital and market opportunities. The cost of capital as
measured by the interest rate is used to analyze the profitability of investment projects. As for
market opportunities, they respond to the concern that investment decisions are guided by the
possibility of achieving maximum returns from the sales of the company. From a macroeconomic
perspective, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is then determined by the change in aggregate
demand and thus by economic growth. Beyond these factors, there are a multitude of variables that
are likely to determine investment decisions. Two types of factors can be put forward in this regard:
the macroeconomic factors and factors related to the economic environment. Among the
macroeconomic factors one can mention the volume of long-term credit to the economy which is
partly determined by the availability of savings, the volume of public investment and the level of
government debt. For factors related to the economic environment one could retain the Doing
Business indicators and governance indicators (political stability, legal system and corruption in
particular).
Africa is one of the world regions whose development potentials are particularly important.
But despite this situation, Africa is one of the continents where poverty exists on a large scale.
More than 44 % of the African population lives below the poverty line. Yet, various forms of
development strategies have been designed and implemented in the African countries. In 1992, in
its publication Governance and Development, the World Bank refers to the quality of government
as the cause of the failure of several of these strategies. Attention is henceforth focused on how
governments organize the management of state and govern economic activities.
The place and the role of institutions in development have been widely discussed in
economic literature. It is commonly accepted that the existence of strong and clear rules is a
fundamental basis for economic activity. In particular, there is an increasingly agreement on the
idea that, in order to stimulate private investment, it is necessary to stabilize the business
environment.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between governance and investment in Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA). In particular, we study how private investment is affected by regulatory
and judiciary systems, political stability, macroeconomic conditions and corruption. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of Sub-Saharan Africa
economic situation, section 3 provides a brief review of related literature, section 4 is dedicated to
the presentation of the methodology used in the study, section 5 discusses empirical results and
section 6 concludes.

1
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An overview of SSA macroeconomic and governance context
The African continent has 54 countries with the Sahara desert separating it in two
different geographical and economic entities, North Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa. SubSaharan Africa comprises 49 countries with a combined population of 875 million in 2011. This
Sub-Saharan part of Africa globally shares similar characteristics.
On the economic side, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the less advanced regions.
According to the World Bank, 48.5% of the sub-Saharan population lived on less than $ 1.25 a
day in 2010 (World Bank, 2013). Issue of development is still on the agenda for this region.
Recent developments of macroeconomic indicators for SSA are favorable. Despite the effects
of the 2008 financial crisis and a slight slowdown in 2013, the World Bank plans good prospects
for the region. Since the mid-1990’s the region have achieved strong and sustained growth. In
2013, average growth rate in SSA was 5% while growth rates of the continent as a whole and
the global economy were respectively 4% and 3%.
However, this relatively strong growth hides large disparities among countries. First,
growth performance varies widely across countries. From 2006 to 2012 growth was good
enough for some countries while others have experienced difficulties. For example, Burkina
Faso records continuous growth over the period (an average of 5%) and Ghana experienced
accelerated growth. Output growth in this country was continuously increasing. In contrast,
Cote d'Ivoire had known negative growth rate from 2000 to 2004 and in 2011. This recession
is mainly due to the crisis experienced by the country during the period. In 2012, the end of the
political crisis marks the return of growth in this country with a growth rate of 9.5%. The second
characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa growth is its high volatility in some countries. In 2001, the
growth rate of Equatorial Guinea amounted to 63.4%. In 2008 and 2010, the growth rate of this
same country was respectively -3% and -1.7%. The 2001 high growth rate in Equatorial Guinea
is mainly due to the discovery and exploitation of new natural resources. But such volatility is
a sign of the shakiness of the engines of growth. This feature is common to most of oil-exporting
countries2.
During the 2000 decade investment rate had an upward trend in Sub-Saharan Africa. It
has gone from 17% in 1999 to 23% in 2009. Since then, investment to GDP ratio remained
steady with an average rate of 22% on the period from 2010 to 2013, (IMF, 2013). The
investment to GDP ratio increased from 17% in 1999 to 22,8% in 2013, (IMF, 2013). The global
financial crisis had affected investment in the region. In 2010 and 2011 the region had
experienced a decline of investment rate that could be attributed to the crisis. Private investment
evolution did not display a clear trend. Private investment rate increased from 21.93% in 2006
to 23% in 2007. From 2008 to 2010 it declined steadily to 21.39% in 2010 and rose slightly to
22.55% in 2011. Regarding public investment, the region had experienced an increase in the
investment to GDP ratio from 7.14% in 2006 to 9.5% in 2010, (World Bank, 2012). This rate
dropped to 5.56% in 2011. FDI as a percentage of GDP is low for the region. But one should

2
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mention that despite the low levels of FDI to GDP ratio, FDI flows increased considerably
during the period. It was multiplied by four from 2006 to 2011, (IMF, 2013).
The success of any development strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa requires stability, a sound
legal and regulatory framework and good governance. The key risk factor that could hinder the
good performance of the region is its stability (IMF, 2013). Several countries in SSA still face
many conflicts and crises. One of four African countries suffers from the effects of armed conflict,
while 20% of Africans live in areas severely disrupted by conflicts, (World Bank, 2011). The risk
of conflict is quite high and the area is also prone to humanitarian crises and terrorist and criminal
networks. This means that economic activities in the region are largely influenced by these
conflicts.
Regarding governance, the region has also mixed results. Poor governance and
dysfunctional political institutions had led to the failure of several projects and development
programs. SSA is the region with the lowest performance with respect to the Doing Business
indicators. The countries of the region combine shaky jurisdictions and complex procedures and
high costs. Because of these, the SSA is farthest from the distance to the frontier3. However, the
region has narrowed the gap since the first publication of the DB report and is closest to the
frontier. The region had recorded best performances in terms of improving the business
environment.
In addition to individual commitment of States in regulatory reforms, some countries have
decided to get together to pursue this goal. These include the Organization for the Harmonization
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) whose focus is legal framework for the private sector.
OHADA comprises 17 countries and aims at setting judicial integration of member countries to
facilitate trade and investment, ensure legal and judicial security of business activities and facilitate
the resolution of conflicts. Participating in such a group has the advantage of helping to harmonize
national practices and to compel states to implement common decisions. This could be considered
as a model of incentives for more dynamic and efficient investment.
A brief review of related literature
Many authors highlighted the importance of institutions based on comparisons of
historically differentiated experiences in some regions. More importantly the difference in
regimes is considered as the main reason behind the development of some regions and not
others. By comparing the legal regimes in force in the seventeenth century across different parts
of the world, North & Thomas (1973) explained why the economic take-off occurred in NorthWest Europe and not in China -the most advanced nation of that period. Both authors agree that
the explanation clearly lies in the nature of legal regimes that were governing these regions. In
contrast to China, countries such as England and the Netherlands had well-defined property
rights pushing individuals to entrepreneurism and innovation for better profits.
3
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In the twentieth century, the world division into two blocs namely the socialist bloc with
planned economy and the liberal block with market economy brought a new focus on the issues
of property rights. According to Hayek, the lack of property rights disables prospects for
benefits of officials and thus prevents the emergence of markets. The dislocation of the socialist
bloc in the 1990’s comforted this idea. More specifically, a similar comparison is made by
Acemoglu et al (2005) between both republics of Korea after the division of the country as a
result of World War II. The Republic of Korea supported by the liberal western block and the
People's Democratic Republic to the supported by the communist Soviet Union. The latter
established socialist leanings institutions by removing property rights and centralizing
economic decisions whereas the Republic in the South developed a market economy with a
constitution and institutions providing incentives to the private sector. Both areas share similar
characteristics in terms of cultures, ethnicities and languages; physical geography and climate
were slightly different while initial conditions in capital stock in infrastructure were in favour
of the Republic of Korea. Half a century after the separation, the national income of the South
part was 15 times higher than income in the North. According to these authors the profound
differences in economic institutions explain these differentiated experiences in terms of
economic performance.
In the same vein, De Soto (1990) seeking to identify the reasons for the low growth in
Peru concluded that cumbersome administrative procedures, corruption and the prevalence of
the informal sector are obstacles to economic dynamism. In such a situation, property rights are
uncertain and risky compensation innovative initiatives, according to North. In 2000, De Soto
(2000) added to his diagnosis that the lack of clearly defined rights complicates the corporate
funding for enterprises.
Recently, several empirical studies were carried out as from the 1990s attempting to
econometrically establish the essential character of the quality of institutions, political stability
and market conditions in the economic growth. We consider the studies of Gwartney & al.
(1996) and the studies of LLSV4. Gwartney & al. (1996) use data of 96 countries over the period
1975-1995 to study the relationship between freedom and economic growth. They used 17
variables grouped into four blocks: currency and inflation; expropriation and discriminatory
taxation; restrictions on international trade; and the size and function of the government. The
results indicate that countries with higher freedom indices systematically have higher growth
rates whilst the size of the government inhibits the growth. In subsequent publications from this
study, it comes out that countries with improved freedom index have experienced stronger
growth. In 2008, Gwartney et al. (2008) established a correlation between the value of the index
of freedom and FDI.
The findings from the LLSV studies were published in 1998 and 1999 respectively on
corporate funding and the quality of governance. The basic idea of the first study was that
companies cannot get funding or refunding from their creditors and shareholders unless they
have confidence that their rights will be safeguarded by legal systems. They collect data on joint
4
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stock companies and sureties of 49 countries. They then grouped these countries into four
groups of legal families: the Anglo-Saxon common law, civil law systems of French and
German inspiration and the Scandinavian inspirations system.
A primary result shows that investor protection significantly varies between legal
families; it is stronger in the Anglo-Saxon system and lower in the French-inspired system. The
end result meanwhile states that countries protecting investors have a weaker growth and low
availability of capital. This result is economically plausible because these are investors
responsible for the accumulation of capital, which is essential to the creation of income. In
1999, the ambition of the authors was quite different but still focusing on institutions. They
attempted to verify previous thesis instead of the quality of governance namely through public
sector institutions (bureaucracy, size of the government, corruption, definition and enforcement
of property rights ...) influencing economic growth. After collecting a large amount of data on
the economic, cultural and religious policy variables, they proceeded with a series of
regressions. The authors came to the conclusion that: the quality of governance is better in rich
countries compared to poor countries, the same improvement was observed in Anglo-Saxon
legal system countries compared to legal civil law tradition countries, and in countries
dominated by Protestantism compared to countries dominated by Catholicism and Islam. In
general, they established that the cultural and religious institutions and context as a whole affect
the economic performance and the economic development, by extension. The LLSV study
findings were so successful that the authors used them to write a thesis entitled Legal Oginis
suggesting that legal systems condition the institutions established and economic outcomes, by
extension. Such an argument would necessarily face critics.
Dam (2006) made a critical review of the vision of the previous results. While accepting
the idea that legal institutions have a critical role in development, the report first points out the
fact that the indices of freedom, functioning and independence of the courts are difficult to
interpret because of their composite construction. It then appears that there are not differences
between legal families for the homelands of these legal traditions. La Porta & al. (2008)
explained that such mother countries like France and Belgium implemented compensation
mechanisms that corrected the weaknesses of their legal system. Spaman also criticizes the
LLSV studies 1998 for using many subjective opinions in the development of some indices. An
important point of controversy is highlighted by Rajan & Zingales (2003) on the development
of financial markets. In fact, in 1919, the development of financial markets was more advanced
in France than in the United States of America. In 1980, there was a reversal of this relation,
while from 1999 the financial development converged in these two countries. That situation
qualified as great reversal challenges the causal role of legal families. Milhaupt & Pistor (2008)
examined a series of crises and connected them with legal families. They concluded that the
predictive power of the theory of legal origins is difficult to establish. What matters to them is
much more the adaptability of systems than the systems themselves. It is clear that the above
criticism does not deny the role of public and legal institutions. There was therefore a global
consensus resulting from the empirical studies and historical analyses. In the early 2000 century
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more focused studies were conducted on how far the institutions influence the economic
performance.
As early as in the 2000s, research started linking economic performance to business
environment indicators. This was made possible thanks to the DB WB project that expanded
and systematized the work of La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov & al (2002) through the
publication of quantitative indicators on the environment companies.
In the article The Regulation of Entry, Siméon Djankov, Raphael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-De-Silanès and Andrei Scheleifer based on data collected in 85 countries including
seventeen (17) SSA countries, developed indicators related to the cost and the number of
procedures one should go to start a typical business. The aim was to test the theories of
regulation, that to see whether the regulations promote growth and well-being of consumers.
Their results showed that countries with a complex regulation do not generally have a better
quality of products; countries with high costs and complex procedures have a large informal
economy and greater corruption. Conversely, they found that entry regulations are more
transparent in democratic countries and those with a limited size of the government. The
methodology they used to develop the indicators is largely close to that used by the World Bank
to develop the Doing Business indicators.
Djankov & al. (2006) considering these indicators for 135 countries showed the
influence of the business environment reforms on the economic growth. By using the ranking
of each country for the indicators, they developed a composite normalized index between 0 and
1. They then regressed this index on per capita GDP growth rate by controlling the quality of
governance and macroeconomic variables. The results showed that the DB indicators have a
positive effect on the growth rate. In particular, countries whose indicators are gone from last
to first quartile experienced a rate of 2.3% increase in their growth rate.
Eifert (2009) also used the DB database from 2003 to 2007 to check the influence of
DB reforms on investment and on the GDP. Analysis of the timing of the quantity of reform
indicates a number of models. Reforms are globally distributed and their impact is more
pronounced in countries with heavy regulations. Macroeconomic characteristics do not
significantly influence the occurrence of reforms. From the overall goal of his study it clearly
comes out that some reforms have a positive impact on the rate of investment and growth
particularly in relatively poor and relatively well-governed countries; the median reform
corresponding to a reduction of the deadlines for business registration by ten days would result
in an increase in the investment rate of 0.27 and 0.15%, respectively.
Klapper & Love (2001) successfully concluded that reforms promote the creation of
new businesses and the aggregate investment on the World Bank database of 92 countries. After
estimating the simple model, they sought to identify to what threshold countries must reduce
an indicator of regulations of entrepreneurship so as to have the greatest change in the rate of
business creation. They lead to relatively poor countries and relatively well-governed having a
faster growth of 0.4% and 0.2% respectively after the implementation of one or several reforms.
Unlike the studies presented above using country aggregated data, there are
microeconomic studies that attempt to assess the impact of regulatory regimes on business
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performance. We retain two studies conducted in this line. The first one conducted by HallwardDriemeier & al. (2006) focused on Chinese companies. The authors used data from the WB5
for 1500 Chinese firms across five cities to measure more accurately the critical elements of the
business environment. In fact, they believe that the overall environmental indicators such as
DB indicators assigning a single score to each country have limitations insofar as the regulation
is not uniform inside large countries such as China because of the high political and economic
decentralization. They perform a series of regressions of various corporate business
performance indicators on the business climate for each region of the country. Selected
performance indicators include: the growth in sales, employment, the rate of investment and
total factor productivity. Their indicators include regional averages of non-permanent
employment rate, access to credit, the proportion of R&D workers using computers, losses due
to power electric load-shedding, transport or waste of the time dedicated to administrative
procedures and corruption scores. They think that these indicators and property are important
for growth, productivity and business investment. The effect is particularly more remarkable
for national and foreign capital property, the simplicity of regulations, corruption, technological
development and the flexibility of the labour market. Oppositely the effect is less remarkable
for improving access to credit and infrastructure quality.
The second study also covered business and focused on Morocco. Augier & al. (2012)
attempted to explain the role of the business environment in the performance of these
companies. They used data from the annual inventories of Moroccan companies (1997 -2004)
and from the WB. The business environment was captured based on access to credit,
asymmetries in the application fees and the dealing with permits, the constraints related to
administration and starting a business and the quality of infrastructure. Business performance
was captured using the total factor productivity estimated by semi-parametric methods. The
results showed a strong correlation between total factor productivity and access to credit; tax
heterogeneity and the bureaucracy and the asymmetry in the application of regulations are
associated with low productivity.
To capture the impact of regulatory reform on investment, the starting point is the
dynamic model of corporate behaviour. This model is widely described by Eifert (2009). The
weight of the various economic sector regulations and the various stages of the business life
had varied influence on their decision-making including the decision on whether to invest or
not. The effects of regulations on businesses are examined through the changes they bring on
fixed costs and variable costs and the recent adjustment costs of the latter.
Regulations resulting in a change in fixed costs businesses almost exclusively affect the
entry of new firms. When regulations create barriers to entry, they force potential entrants
expecting low productivity to cancel or at least delay their entry. Most of them remain in the
informal sector where regulatory requirements are lower, proportionally to development
opportunities such as access to bank credit. On the other hand, this type of regulations acts as a
filter that excludes low productivity enterprises. They also influence the degree of competition
5
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in the economy, increasing the marginal product of factors for existing businesses. In this way,
this type of regulations has an ambiguous overall effect.
Regulations affecting variable costs increase of enterprises namely production costs of
each unit of product. They thus create a loss for the companies on each product unit sold. Very
logically, they therefore affect the performance of the business they govern. As for the
adjustment costs, they represent the different costs that companies incur as a result of
fluctuations in the production but which are not followed by changes in the factors used because
of the rigidities of the regulation. Such costs create friction depending on the size of the
company.
Ultimately, a decrease in fixed costs incurred by a regulatory reform could more likely
result in facilitating the entry of low productivity anticipating a low level of profit. This could
simplify access of the poor to the formal economy and to better opportunities. However, the
regulations that significantly affecting the aggregate economic performance are those affecting
the variable costs and the adjustment costs. However, we paid attention to regulations affecting
business entry. In fact, a reform facilitates the entry of smaller firms but it facilitates greater
productivity companies. Regulation has complex effects on businesses and the different
categories of regulation could be integrated into a dynamic model of firm behaviour.
Considering the enormous complexity of this model, it is possible to specify a more simple and
operational model that captures the impact of the overall regulation on macroeconomic
variables (Eifert, 2009).
Methodology
Variables specification and data sources
In recent studies Doing Business indicators were used to capture the business environment
and its impact on economic performances (Djankov and al (2006); Klapper & Love (2010); Eifert
(2009)). Other indicators are available for this type of evaluation. But a quick analysis suggests
that the DB indicators are strongly correlated with most other baseline indicators6. Therefore, this
study will use the DB indicators as indicators of the business environment. Besides the usual DB
indicators the new indicator, the distance to the frontier will be used.
Three of the ten categories of indicators will not be considered in this study. The first one
is getting electricity. Data for this area is only available over half of the study period (from 2009).
The two other indicators are protecting investors and getting credit. Data for these categories of
indicators do not vary over the period for the countries covered.
For selected categories, preference is given to the time taken, expressed in days, to
implement procedure rather than to the number of procedures. Both indicators contain the same
information but the timeline is a more informative than the number of procedures.

6
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Cost indicators evaluated as a percentage of GDP do not enable to measure the
implemented reforms since their variations are largely influenced by GDP variations. Yet, GDP is
widely volatile for many sub-Saharan African countries. These indicators will not be taken into
account. Such indicators include the cost for starting a business; the cost for dealing with
construction permits, the minimum capital for starting a business as a percentage of GDP. Not all
areas assessed are subject to common practices across all the countries of the region. For example,
countries such as South Africa, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Mauritania do not have
practice for three of the four indicators for resolving insolvency regulation. These three indicators
are also discarded from the analysis.
Progress of DB indicators over the period
Data from thirty eight countries are used for the study over the period 2006-2011. During
this period some indicators have been improved to facilitate the business culture. To assess the
evolution of these indicators over the period for the sampled countries, we observed the progress
of three specific values namely, the mean, minimum and maximum of each indicator. Table 1
displays these figures. Most number of days required to complete procedures are on average below
100 days, except for dealing with construction permits (over 200 days) and especially for the
implementation of contracts which varies very slightly and remains higher than 600 days over the
entire period. The average number of days generally tends to slightly decrease. Average costs also
showed a downward trend, except for costs relating to trading across-borders (exports and imports)
that have an upward trend; there was a steeper decline in the average cost of dealing with
construction permits. The slight change in the average level of indicators does not mean that these
indicators have not improved. In fact, countries performed different levels of reforms in the areas
measured. Some countries experienced very low progress while others experienced significant
improvements. In this way, improvements in indicators were not sufficient to significantly change
the average levels. For example, for the number of days related to starting a business, Equatorial
Guinea increased only from 137 days to 135 days, while Burkina Faso and Rwanda increased from
40 and 200 days to 14 and 8 days respectively.
Extreme values of the indicators did not significantly vary as well. The minimum level
decreased for nine indicators but stayed unchanged for four indicators in 2006 and 2011; the
minimum level increased for three indicators. Regarding the upper ends, the maximum levels
increased for seven indicators, decreased for eight indicators; remained at the initial level for only
one. Once again, the strong distribution of reforms comes out of this. Reforms in different fields
are distributed across countries and over the period; and the scope of the reforms is also distributed
in space and time.
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Table 1: Progress of Doing Business
indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa
min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Cost for starting a business
Max
Min
Time dealing with construction permits Mean
Max
min
Cost for dealing with construction
Mean
permits
Max
min
Time for registering property
Mean
Max
min
Cost for registering property
Mean
Max
Min
Number of taxes payments
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Total of tax payments
Max
min
Time for Importation
Mean
Max
Min
Cost for Importation
Mean
Max
min
Time for Exportation
Mean
Max
min
Costs for exportation
Mean
Max
min
Time for enforcing contracts
Mean
Max
Min
Cost for enforcing contracts
Mean
Time for starting a business

2006
2007
2008 2009 2010 2011
13
13
7
6
3
3
57
55
50
44
42
42
153
135
135
161
161
161
8.6
6.9
5.3
1.7
1.4
1.5
244.4
196.1
191.8 135.3 119.6
93
209.5 1314.6 1180.7 935.4 847.6 228.4
79
79
79
79
53
75
213
219
20
224
205
199
533
533
533
614
614
614
14.7
13.4
16.4
13.1
9.4
10.9
1779.57 1612.9 1619.6 1218 1318.3 1030
13205.2 10829.4 12219.7 8794.5 13138 6822.8
9
9
9
9
9
9
103
92
88
80
70.4
65
397
371
371
334
295
295
1.6
1.7
1.3
0.6
0.5
0.4
11.9
11.95
11.43 10.52
9.97
9
25
27.1
27.9
25
20.6
20.6
8
8
8
8
8
8
41
40
40
40
39.7
40
66
66
66
66
66
64
15.4
15.4
15
15
15
14.3
76.5
78.47
77.5
77.3
73.6
73.5
286.5
292.1
292.1 292.1 292.1 339.1
13
13
13
13
11
10
48
47
44
42
40
39
78
102
102
102
100
101
683
683
673
677
689
689
2111 2086.5 2112.2 2404.6 2475.3 2650.9
5715
5715
5715 6215 6345 8525
13
13
14
14
11
10
39
37
36
35
34
32
78
78
78
78
75
75
463
624
697
725
737
737
1675.3 1679.4 1698.4 1926.7 1988.5 2032.6
4867
4867
4867 5367 5497 5902
276
276
276
276
260
230
653
656
655
667
651
647
1070
1280
1280 1280 1280 1296
14.3
14.3
14.3
14.3
14.3
14.3
53.1
52.6
52.6
51.9
51.9
52.7
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Max
151.8
min
0
Average for resolving insolvency
Mean
17.7
Max
51.8
Source: Authors from the World Bank Doing Business data

151.8
0
20.1
57.5

151.8
0
18.1
57.1

151.8
0
18
57.5

151.8
0
18.2
57.5

151.8
0
19.1
60.8

Correlations between indicators
We started by investigating the existence of a correlation between indicators applied to a
same area (Table 2). A positive correlation could be observed between the indicators for starting
a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, trading across borders and
paying taxes. The correlation is remarkably high for the time and costs for export and import (over
50%) as well as for starting a business.

Table 2: Correlation between indicators of the same area
Indicators

Correlation7

Deadline
Cost

Starting a business

0.32

Deadline
Dealing with construction permits

Cost

0.15

Deadline
Cost

Registering property

0.10

Number of payments
global average

Payment of taxes

0.045

Deadline
Cost

Enforcing contracts

Deadline for exportation
Cost for exportation
Deadline for importation

Trading across-border

Cost of importation
Regulation of insolvency recovery rate

0.074

0.70

0.73

Recovery average

Source: Authors from the World Bank Doing Business data

Data displayed show existence of strong correlation between indicators of cross-border trade.

7

Interrelationship between the indicators of the same category
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The correlation between the time for export and import is 90% and the one between the
costs of the same indicators is over 91%8. We retain for the estimations indicators related to export.
Following the same logic, for areas showing indicators with a relatively high correlation, we use a
single indicator and show preference to time indicators rather than the costs as they are expressed
in relative values, so that the variations observed can be due to comparable variables. Conversely,
variations deadlines better capture the effects of reforms. Candidate Business environment
indicators are the following:
 The deadline for starting a business;
 The deadline for dealing with construction permits;
 The deadline and cost for registering property;
 The deadline and cost for enforcing contracts;
 The deadline and costs of exportation;
 The number of payments and total amount paid for taxes;
 The rate of insolvency collection.
Macroeconomic variables
We consider macroeconomic variables from the database of the World Bank for SSA.
These macroeconomic variables include the variable of interest pertaining to private investment
and variables that explain the level of investment. They also serve as a control variables. The GDP
growth rate enables to control the influence of economic cycles. Variables capturing the quality of
the policy environment and governance are also used as controls as agents may change their
investment decisions based on the levels of these indices: Political Rights and civil Liberties
indices of Freedom House and the perception of corruption by Transparency International.
Private investment is the variable being observed. It is represented by private sector gross fixed
capital formation. We have already mentioned the upward trend between 2006 and 2011 of this
variable in the previous section. The theories presented on the relationship between investment
and business environment is reminiscent of a correlation. Yet, there is no prior indication of such
relationship. That is why in the development of private investment we must get to discard the
effects of other variables to only keep those of the business environment.
Macroeconomic variables used as control variables are the following:
 The GDP growth rate: The product level is a key determinant in deciding to invest in the
economic literature: either whether ex-ante in the Keynesian base model and ex-post in the
classic model. In general, it is clear that we decide to invest in order to achieve production.
 The balance of the current account
 Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
 Inflation
 Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP
 The quality of governance and institutions
8

A similar result has been found by Eifert B., (2009) on the relative indicators to the imports and exports for 135
countries.
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Evaluation is done here based on two indices published by Freedom House and
Transparency International for the countries covered. Every year Transparency International
publishes an indicator called Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) based on expert opinion surveys.
Countries are ranked from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low level of perceived corruption). The series
of this index was created from CPI reports from 2006 to 2011. In general, they indicate a strong
correlation between corruption and poverty. In 2006, only two SSA countries (Botswana and
Mauritius) had an index over 5. In 2011, only Cape Verde and Rwanda were added to the top half
of the index. This reflects a positive trend for the indicator though at a very moderate pace in the
area. Since 1950, Freedom House has been publishing annually indicators on the state of civil
liberties and political rights. Both indices are available on the website of the institution; vary
between 1 and 7. One stands for best performances of rights and liberties and, 7 stands for the
poorest performance. The political rights index considers three areas: electoral process, political
pluralism and participation and functioning of government. The index of civil liberties includes
the following areas: freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization,
law enforcement and personal autonomy and individual liberties. We found a strong correlation
between these two indices (around 90%), which led us to consider that the index of civil liberties
in the estimate.
The model
There are various models used to investigate the relation between regulation and economic
performance at the level of firms or countries depending on the nature of the data used. Djankov
& al. (2006) studied correlations between regulation indicators and economic performance of firms
using cross-sectional data. The model used is as follows:
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥′𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 Where 𝑦𝑖 measures economic performance and 𝑥𝑖 measures regulatory
indicators and control variables.
However, the hypothesis of identification 𝐸[𝜀𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 ] = 0 indicating that there are no omitted
variables that affect the economic performance and are correlated with indicators and variables of
control seem to be strong enough. An improved version of this model is proposed by Rajan &
Zingales (1998) using also cross-sectional data but taking the explanatory variables in double
differences. This way of doing captures changes in the economic performance affected by changes
in the regulatory environment. The first advantage of this model is that it addresses the issue of
omitted variables. However, it shares the common limitation characterizing cross-sectional data
models: non-inclusion of individual-specific structural differences on the dependent variable.
The basic model used in this study is similar to that of Eifert (2009). Panel data procedure
will be performed. The model is as follows:
′
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
under the hypothesis 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡 |𝑥𝑖𝑡 ; 𝑐𝑖 , 𝜗𝑡 ] implying that the errors are not correlated with indicators
given the 𝑐𝑖 individual effects and 𝜗𝑡 temporal effects. This model is advantageous for many
reasons. Above all, it addresses the issue of omitted variables constant over time. In addition, it
helps control the country-specific trends. These two points are important for our subject because
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the regulatory framework is often heavily influenced by national or sub-regional policies such as
employment promotion policies often through the provision of loan facility.
The model used for the estimation is as follows:
INVESTit = X'it β + αi PIBit + γi DGVRNMTit + δi CREDITit + θi PIBit-1 +
ρi INVESTit-1 +σi INFLATit + τi CLit + φi IPCit + ci + ϑt + εit
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of business environment indicators for the country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 , stands for private investment as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is GDP annual growth rate of country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐷𝐺𝑉𝑅𝑁𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑡 , stands for Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡;
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡;
𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 The balance of the current account as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 (it-1) the rate of GDP growth for country i lagged for one period;
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 (it-1) private investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 The inflation rate for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 ;
𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 et 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 index of civil liberties and the index of perception of corruption for country 𝑖 in
year 𝑡 ;
𝑐𝑖 Specific timeless effect for country;
𝜗𝑡 The temporal effect common in all countries;
𝜀𝑖𝑡 The error term
The hypothesis of identification supposes that the errors are not correlated with
macroeconomic and control indicators and variables. Adding lagged dependent variable to the
regressor responds to the need to consider the dynamics of investment. Like most macroeconomic
variables, investment is dependent on cyclical developments; hence the level of investment in a
given year may correlate with the previous investment levels. Furthermore, the presence of this
lagged variable makes our model a dynamic panel model. Assessing such a model requires specific
procedures.
The procedure for assessment
Two models are implemented depending on the on the nature of indicators used: the first
(Model I) uses the common DB indicators while the second one (Model II) uses the indicators of
distance to the frontier. These two models are estimated for the entire sample.
In the investment equation, the lagged investment appears as an explanatory variable; so we are in
the presence of a dynamic panel. In addition, the time dimension of our panel is relatively reduced
compared to the number of individuals. For this, we use the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) system developed by Blundell & Bond (1998), which is suitable for estimating panel
whose temporal dimension is reduced according to Rodman (2006). The author shows the
weakness of the other estimators compares to the benefits of the GMM estimator in situations
similar to ours.
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The GMM estimator is based on the orthogonality conditions between the lagged variables
and the error term. The first GMM estimator is the one with first difference developed by Arellano
& Bond (1991). It also takes the first difference of the original model, which eliminates the
individual effects. The values of the endogenous variables lagged one period or more are
increasingly integrated as tools. The estimation is done in two steps. However, this estimator has
a limitation as it does not take the effect of factors invariant over time into account. Thus, small
samples lead to biased results. To fill the gap of the dynamic panel estimator by Arellano and
Bond, Blundell & Bond (1998) developed the GMM estimator system. It combines the in level
and first difference equations, hence the characterization as system. The level equation uses
different tools from the difference equation. In our case, we use the one-step GMM estimator
system of Blundell and Bond. We introduce the following tools: the lagged two periods to take
investment adjustments into account.
Empirical results
Diagnostic tests
Before performing the panel procedure and the GMM procedure, a number of tests are
required. It is essential perform a specification test in order to check whether the data available
match with the panel model. When considering panel data, the first step is to check the requirement
of homogeneous or heterogeneous data generating process (Hurlin & Mignon, 2006). This consists
in checking in the econometric model envisioned whether the coefficients are the same for all
countries. The over identification and error auto-correlation test should be also performed to check
for the validity of the tools used. These tests were performed. The results are shown in Table 3 and
Table 4. Data in table 3 indicate that the values of Fisher statistic do not enable to accept the null
hypothesis of no individual effects. The equation with individual effects defined above is therefore
assumed. The statistic of autocorrelation error tested by the Arellano and Bond method indicates
that only errors are auto-correlated at order 1 but not at order 2 (Table 4). The Hansen-Sargan
statistics for the GMM estimated models have critical values higher than 10% (Table 4). We
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the tools.

Table 3: Results of the specification test
SSA
Fischer
P-Value

Model I
10.19
0.000
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8.85
0.000
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Table 4: Results of autocorrelation and over-identification test
SSA
AR(1)
AR(2)
Hansen

Modèle I
-1,89
(0,059)
-0,344
(0,731)
32,71
(0,307)

Modèle II
-1,76
(0,079)
-0,64
(0,522)
21,81
(0,410)

Results and interpretation
Ten out of the eleven indicators that were measured are expected to be negatively correlated
to investment. Only the recovery rate is supposed to positively influence investment rate in case
of insolvency. The results of the estimations are reported in Tables 5 for Model I and Table 6 for
Model II. For Model I, only three indicators have the expected signs: the deadline for starting a
business, the deadline for registering property and the cost for enforcing contracts. The deadline
for starting a business is not significant while the deadline for registering property and the cost for
enforcing contracts are significant at the 5% and 1% significant level respectively. Empirical
evidence enables us to assert a positive effect of these two indicators on private investment. More
specifically, based on our results, reducing the deadline by 10 days for registering property
generates an increase in investment up to 0.16% of GDP. Likewise, a10%, decrease in the cost that
enterprises incur to enforce contracts leads to a higher investment rate of 0, 32 points.
Table 5: Results of Model I
Field
Starting a business
Dealing with construction
permits
Registering property
Payment of taxes
Exportation
Enforcing contracts

Indicators
Deadline

Estimated coefficient
-0.001384

p-value
0.853

Deadline

0.0047463*

0.081

Deadline
Cost
Number of payments
Global rate
Deadline
Cost
Deadline

-0.0155097**
0.083596
0.0781372*
0.0114703**
0.0363033
0.000467
0.0043659***

0.038
0.332
0.051
0.012
0.184
0.338
0.000

Cost

-0.0323676***

0.004

Resolving insolvency
Recovery rate
-0.0683689**
0.022
*** indicates 1% level of significance; ** indicates 5% level of significance; * indicates 10% level of
significance.
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These results are particularly interesting regarding the effects of the business environment
on investment. However, it should be underlined that we get only two significant indicators and
many do not have the expected sign. Eifert (2009) also obtained mixed results in the estimate of
the investment function: all the coefficients of the indicators had the expected signs but none were
significant. One reason for this may be of practical order. Even though the indicators potentially
influence investment decisions, it is possible that investors do not attach the same importance to
all indicators as well. This is plausible to the extent that the measured data do not affect businesses
to the same magnitude. Large investors would give great importance to enforcing contracts as they
are frequently involved in larger contracts, while small investors would closely look at the
procedures and entry costs. Another interesting fact regarding the deadline for starting a business
is the following one: while this is the area most frequently cited in the reforms, it is not significant
in any estimation as in Eifert (2009). Without being able to give an exact explanation of this result,
this could be linked to the fact that although investors attach importance to the procedures of entry,
they care about challenges encountered in carrying out their activities.
Moreover, it should be reminded that the DB indicators measure the de jure regulations,
while there are practices overriding these legal arrangements. The facto regulations including
corruption and the payment of bribes, could therefore replace the regulation captured by indicators.
We should then moderate the expected influence of these indicators on investment. According to
Eifert (2009) there is a clear need to consider whether the reforms captured by indicators have an
impact, because of the irregularities and the non-enforcement; This particularly makes sense for
developing
countries.

Table 6: Estimate results of Model II for SSA
Indicators
Starting a business
Dealing with construction permits

Estimated coefficient
0.0936672***
-0.0839274***

p-value
0.000
0.000

Registering property
-0.0568171***
Getting credit
-0.0123015
Payment of taxes
-0.0850154***
Trade across borders
-0.0017965
Enforcing contracts
0.0454649
Resolving Insolvency
-0.0284549
*** indicates 1% level of significance; ** indicates 5% level of significance; * indicates 10%
significance.

0.000
0.734
0.000
0.925
0.178
0.318
level of

Table 6 presents the estimation results of Model II. Six out of the eight indicators of
distance to the frontier have the expected sign: dealing with construction permits, registering
property, getting credit, paying taxes, resolving insolvency and trading across borders. Dealing
with construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes are significant at the 1%.
These results show that increase for a relative distance of a country compared to best practices in
dealing with construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes, this generates a
decline in the investment. This could be explained by the fact that investors or appreciate based on
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the location of investment firms: they seek the best return for their money and are encouraged to
select countries where regulations are relatively flexible, simpler, and less expensive . The
implications of this finding are important. Indeed, countries wishing to attract investment must
work to bring best practices in terms of regulations because arbitration can be done on the target
invest countries as a result of capital mobility.
Conclusion and policy implication
This study aimed at determining the causal relationship between business environment and
economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank doing Business indicators along
with other macroeconomic variable were used to perform a panel analysis using a GMM
procedure. The results of the estimations show that the time taken for registering property and the
cost and time of transfer of ownership have a significant impact on private investment. The results
indicate also that region were able to narrow the distance to the frontier with construction permits,
registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, resolving insolvency and trading across borders.
From a policy point of view, the study highlighted the fact that SSA countries must continue the
reform undertaken so as to reduce the burden of regulations on businesses. Along with
implementing actions to foster the effect of good business practices, corruption and bureaucracy
should be tackled to reduce the gap between rules and practices. Third, the DB indicators to be
more useful to investors should pay attention to the countries realities and particularities; these are
the real facts that need to be considered because there are the ones that actually affect investors.
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